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How does international ﬁnancial integration aect national price levels? To analyze this question,
this paper formulates a two-country open economy sticky-price model under either segmented
or complete asset markets. It is shown that the eect of ﬁnancial integration, i.e. moving from
segmented to complete asset markets, is regime-dependent. Under managed exchange rates,
ﬁnancial integration raises the national price level. Under ﬂoating exchange rates, however,
ﬁnancial integration lowers national price levels. Thus, the paper proposes a novel argument to
rationalize systematic deviations from PPP. Panel evidence for 54 countries supports the main
ﬁndings. A 10% larger ratio of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP, our measure of international
ﬁnancial integration, increases the national price level by 0.27 percentage points under ﬁxed and
intermediate exchange rate regimes and lowers the price level by 0.3 percentage points under
ﬂoating exchange rates.
Keywords:
International ﬁnancial integration, exchange rate regime, national price level, PPP, foreign asset
position
JEL-Classiﬁcation:
F21, F36, F41Non-technical summary
Over the last two decades, ﬁnancial market globalisation has become an important aspect of
the world economy. Since the early 1970s, international capital market transactions have grown
more sharply than world GDP. This paper analyses the consequences of this development for
the internationally comparable equilibrium price level in industrialised and emerging market
economies. A ﬁrst look at the data gives the impression that closer ﬁnancial integration is
associated with an increase in the price level of the countries concerned. This paper sets out to
explain this positive relationship in the framework of a standard general equilibrium model of an
open economy. However, in this framework, it also becomes clear that this positive relationship
is not universally valid. In fact, it will be demonstrated that the exchange rate regime — and
therefore the ability of monetary policy to inﬂuence prices — plays a decisive role. The positive
relationship between ﬁnancial market integration and the national price level should, according to
the theoretical model, only be true in countries with managed exchange rates, whereas a negative
relationship should be observable in countries where the nominal exchange rate can ﬂoat freely
and the country’s monetary policy is able to act independently of the nominal exchange rate.
In the theoretical model, the potentially existing risk premium, which is demanded by sticky-
price good producers, and its interaction with the exchange rate expectation play a crucial role
in explaining the dierent eects ﬁnancial market integration has on national price levels. The
following arguments and combinations of arguments — depending on the integration of ﬁnancial
markets and the exchange rate regime choice — explain the results: a risk premium of domestic
sticky-price goods has a positive eect on the domestic price level and can only be controlled in
a ﬂexible exchange rate environment. This risk premium increases the expected exchange rate
(depreciation) while the exchange rate volatility lowers it. In each case, this eect only occurs
in segmented ﬁnancial markets, not in fully integrated ﬁnancial markets. In a ﬂexible exchange
rate regime, relative price changes are allowed for and the risk premium — and therefore the
domestic price level — is reduced. The reduced price level aects exchange rate expectations in
segmented ﬁnancial markets and causes a higher national price level. The opposite eect occurs
in the case of an exchange rate peg. In the end, the following situations should be distinguished:
in the process of international ﬁnancial integration, the national price level rises only in the case
of managed exchange rates. In the case of ﬂoating exchange rates, by contrast, the process of
ﬁnancial integration lowers the national price level.
This result is corroborated by panel data for 54 countries. It is shown that moving from seg-
mented to complete international asset markets, i.e. moving to international ﬁnancial integration,
lowers national price levels for those countries that let their exchange rate ﬂoat. In pegged orintermediate exchange rate regimes, however, closer ﬁnancial integration raises national price
levels. For example, a 10% higher ratio of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP increases the
national price level by 0.27 percentage points in ﬁxed and intermediate exchange rate regimes
and lowers the price level by 0.3 percentage points in the case of ﬂoating exchange rates. These
eects are most clearly seen for OECD countries and are less clear-cut for developing countries.Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
In den letzten zwanzig Jahren wurde die Weltwirtschaft zunehmend von der Globalisierung an
den Finanzmärkten geprägt. Das Transaktionsvolumen an den internationalen Kapitalmärk-
ten hat seit Anfang der Siebzigerjahre stärker zugenommen als das weltweit erwirtschaftete
Bruttoinlandsprodukt. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht, welche Folgen diese Entwicklung
für das international vergleichbare gleichgewichtige Preisniveau in Industrie- und Schwellen-
ländern hat. Auf den ersten Blick vermitteln die Daten den Eindruck, dass die zunehmende
Integration der Finanzmärkte in diesen Ländern mit einem Preisniveauanstieg einhergeht. In
dieser Arbeit wird versucht, diese positive Beziehung anhand eines standardisierten allgemeinen
Gleichgewichtsmodells einer oenen Volkswirtschaft zu erklären. Dabei wird gleichwohl auch
deutlich, dass diese positive Beziehung nicht immer besteht. Vielmehr wird gezeigt, dass das
Wechselkursregime und damit die Fähigkeit der Geldpolitik, die Preisentwicklung zu steuern,
eine entscheidende Rolle spielen. Dem theoretischen Modell zufolge sollte der positive Zusam-
menhang zwischen der Finanzmarktintegration und dem Preisniveau eines Landes nur in Län-
dern mit kontrollierten Wechselkursen bestehen; in Ländern mit frei schwankenden nominalen
Wechselkursen, wo die Geldpolitik unabhängig vom nominalen Wechselkurs agieren kann, sollte
dagegen ein negativer Zusammenhang zu beobachten sein.
Im theoretischen Modell spielt die Risikoprämie, die eventuell von den Produzenten von
Gütern mit unﬂexiblen Preisen verlangt wird, sowie deren Zusammenwirken mit den Wech-
selkurserwartungen und der Wechselkursvariabilität eine wesentliche Rolle bei der Erklärung
der unterschiedlichen Auswirkungen, die die Finanzmarktintegration auf das Preisniveau in den
einzelnen Ländern hat. Die folgenden Argumentationen erklären — je nach Integrationsgrad der
Finanzmärkte und Wechselkursregime — die Ergebnisse: Eine Risikoprämie für inländische Güter
mit unﬂexiblen Preisen wirkt sich positiv auf das inländische Preisniveau aus und lässt sich nur
in einem System ﬂexibler Wechselkurse steuern. Diese Risikoprämie führt zu der Erwartung
eines höheren Wechselkurses (Abwertung), während Wechselkursschwankungen zur Folge haben,
dass niedrigere Wechselkurse erwartet werden. In jedem Fall tritt dieser Eekt nur in segmen-
tierten, nicht aber an vollständig integrierten Finanzmärkten auf. In einem System ﬂexibler
Wechselkurse gibt es Raum für relative Preisänderungen, so dass die Risikoprämie und damit
das inländische Preisniveau niedriger ausfallen. Bei segmentierten Finanzmärkten beeinﬂussen
diese niedrigen Preise die Wechselkurserwartungen und führen zu einem Anstieg des inländischen
Preisniveaus. Ist der Wechselkurs an eine andere Währung gebunden, verläuft diese Entwick-
lung in die entgegengesetzte Richtung. Letzten Endes ist zwischen den folgenden Situationen zu
unterscheiden: Während des Prozesses der Integration der internationalen Finanzmärkte steigtdas Preisniveau eines Landes nur im Falle kontrollierter Wechselkurse. Bei frei schwankenden
Wechselkursen hingegen führt die Finanzmarktintegration zu einer Verringerung des inländischen
Preisniveaus.
Dieses Ergebnis wird durch ein Datenpanel zu 54 Ländern bestätigt. Es wird gezeigt, dass
durch einen Übergang von segmentierten zu vollständigen internationalen Märkten für Vermö-
genswerte, d.h. durch eine Integration der internationalen Finanzmärkte, das inländische Preis-
niveau in den Ländern sinkt, die ihre Wechselkurse frei schwanken lassen. Bei Wechselkurs-
anbindungen oder Zwischenformen führt die stärkere Finanzmarktintegration jedoch zu einem
Anstieg des Preisniveaus eines Landes. Beispielsweise lässt eine Zunahme des Verhältnisses der
ausländischen Vermögenswerte und Verbindlichkeiten zum BIP um 10% das inländische Preis-
niveau in einem System fester Wechselkurse oder einer Zwischenform um 0,27 Prozentpunkte
steigen, während es bei frei schwankenden Wechselkursen um 0,3 Prozentpunkte sinkt. Diese
Eekte treten bei den OECD-Ländern am deutlichsten zutage, sind bei Entwicklungsländern
aber weniger eindeutig zu erkennen.Contents
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Over the last two decades, international ﬁnancial market integration has dramatically increased,
leading to ﬁnancial interconnectedness not only of regions but also of geographically distant
countries. How does this ongoing ﬁnancial market integration aect domestic inﬂation and price
levels? And which role does monetary policy play in this process? Most of the debate on the
consequences of globalisation on inﬂation, however, focuses on the eect of trade integration on
inﬂation dynamics and national price levels. It is argued that increased goods market integra-
tion leads to a decline in the price level due to ﬁercer competition, a more e!cient allocation
of production and a disciplining eect on national policy makers. For recent contributions,
see Bernanke (2007), Borio and Filardo (2007) or IMF (2006).2 So far, the literature has not
discussed the eect of monetary policy on national price levels in industrialised and emerging
market economies in the case of international ﬁnancial integration.3 This paper aims to close
this gap. A ﬁrst look at the data gives the impression that closer ﬁnancial integration is as-
sociated with an increase in the price level of the countries concerned. Figure (1) shows the
relationship between the (log of the) internationally comparable national price level and the de-
gree of international ﬁnancial integration measured by the stock of foreign assets and liabilities
for 54 industrialised and emerging countries between 1970 and 2004. There is a clear positive
relationship between these two variables. Countries that are more ﬁnancially integrated into the
world economy exhibit a higher national price level. While trade integration arguably lowers
prices, ﬁnancial integration seems to raise the price level.
This paper can explain this positive relationship in a framework of a standard two-country
open economy sticky-price model (see, for example, Devereux and Engel (2003), Obstfeld and
Rogo (2000a) and Sutherland (2005)) in dierent asset market structures. However, it also
becomes clear in this framework that this positive relationship is not universally valid. In fact, it
1Authors’ a!liation: Mathias Homann: Deutsche Bundesbank, Economic Research, 60431 Frankfurt/Main,
Germany. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author but not necessarily those of the Bundesbank.
E-mail: mathias.hoffmann@bundesbank.de
Peter Tillmann: University of Bonn, Institute for International Economics, Lennéstr. 37, 53113 Bonn, Germany.
E-mail: tillmann@iiw.uni-bonn.de
2Ball (2006), by contrast, argues that globalisation has no impact on domestic inﬂation.
3A large amount of literature investigates the eect of ﬁnancial integration on growth and macroeconomic
volatility. See Kose et al. (2006) for a recent survey on ﬁnancial globalisation.
1will be demonstrated that the exchange rate regime — and therefore the ability of monetary policy
to inﬂuence prices — plays a decisive role. The positive relationship between ﬁnancial market
integration and the national price level should, according to the theoretical model, only be true in
countries with managed exchange rates, whereas a negative relationship should be observable in
countries where the nominal exchange rate can ﬂoat freely and the country’s monetary policy is
able to act independently of the nominal exchange rate. Given that the majority of observations
in ﬁgure (1) reﬂect de facto managed exchange rates, the ﬁgure disguises this important regime-
dependent relationship. In order to assess the eect monetary policy has on the national price
level in the process of international ﬁnancial market integration, the theoretical model focuses
on a ﬁxed and ﬂoating exchange rate rule. In this way, attention is restricted to a monetary
policy of targeting a subset of CPI consisting of domestically produced goods prices. The latter
rule parallels the optimal rule of price stability that results from many recent closed economy
sticky-price models (see, for example, King and Wolman (1999) and Woodford (2003)) and
corresponds to a ﬂoat. It is assumed that the monetary policy rules are equally credible. The
paper therefore abstracts from credibility issues of monetary policy and assesses the properties of
the alternative exchange rate arrangements on the national price level in the process of ﬁnancial
market integration.4
The regime-dependent inﬂuence of international ﬁnancial market integration on the national
price level is the result of the potentially existing risk premium, which is demanded by sticky-
price good producers, and its interaction with the exchange rate expectation and exchange
rate volatility. The following arguments and combinations of arguments — depending on the
integration of ﬁnancial markets and the exchange rate regime choice — explain the results: a
risk premium of domestic sticky-price goods has a positive eect on the domestic price level and
can only be controlled in a ﬂexible exchange rate environment. This risk premium increases the
expected exchange rate while the exchange rate volatility lowers it. In each case, this eect only
occurs in segmented ﬁnancial markets, not in fully integrated ﬁnancial markets. In a ﬂexible
exchange rate regime, relative price changes are allowed for and the risk premium — and therefore
the domestic price level — is reduced. The reduced price level aects exchange rate expectations in
segmented ﬁnancial markets and causes a higher national price level. The opposite eect occurs
in the case of an exchange rate peg. In the end, the following situations should be distinguished:
in the process of international ﬁnancial integration, the national price level rises only in the case
of managed exchange rates. In the case of ﬂoating exchange rates, by contrast, the process of
4To classify exchange rate regimes, we rely on the de facto classiﬁcations recently provided by literature.
Hence, we do not rely on the exchange rate regime that is o!cially announced to the International Monetary
Fund.
2ﬁnancial integration lowers the national price level.
This result it corroborated by panel data for 54 countries. In accordance with the theoretical
notion of asset trade, we measure the degree of international ﬁnancial integration by the country’s
gross foreign asset position. It is shown that moving from segmented to complete international
asset markets, i.e. moving to international ﬁnancial integration, lowers national price levels
for those countries that let their exchange rate ﬂoat. In pegged or intermediate exchange rate
regimes, however, closer ﬁnancial integration raises national price levels. For example, a 10%
higher ratio of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP increases the national price level by 0.27
percentage points in ﬁxed and intermediate exchange rate regimes and lowers the price level by
0.3 percentage points in the case of ﬂoating exchange rates. These eects are most clearly seen
for OECD countries and are less clear-cut for developing countries.
The paper also contributes to the analysis of the puzzling behaviour of the real exchange
rate. A vast amount of literature documents systematic departures from purchasing power
parity (PPP). In a related paper, Broda (2006) sheds light on the role of the exchange rate
regime choice for these departures. He ﬁnds that the national price level is systematically higher
in the case of ﬁxed exchange rates than in ﬂoating regimes. However, he is not able to trace
these observable dierences back to underlying economic forces. We will extend this analysis and
oer a rationale for Broda’s observation in terms of the role of ﬁnancial integration. According
to our ﬁndings, the process of international ﬁnancial integration aects the price level dierently
in the case of ﬂoats than in the case of pegs.
The remainder of this paper provides the relevant underlying theory in section 2. Section 3
discusses the data used, provides an explanation of the econometric methodology and reports
the empirical evidence. Finally, section 4 summarises the main results.
2 The model
The starting point of the analysis is a stochastic two economy world, which consists of a home, K,
and foreign, I, country. It is assumed that the agents in the home and foreign country produce
tradeable goods. Home agents are indexed by numbers in the interval [0>1] and foreign agents
reside on [0>P]. The population size of the foreign country corresponds simply to P while the
share of the home population in the world population equals P =1 @(1 + P). The agents in the
domestic economy consume a basket consisting of a continuum of sticky price home and foreign
produced goods. Each household l provides labour supply to producers of ﬁxed price goods.
The prices of the goods are set in advance of the realization of shocks. It follows that producers
meet the demand at the pre-set price. Thus, when the ﬁxed goods price is chosen, exogenous
3changes realized at the current period are not known.5 The foreign country conditions, labeled
by an asterisk  are deﬁned in an analogous manner and are only presented when necessary.
There is only one period and at the beginning of the period households trade if markets are
not segmented in a world market in state contingent assets before the exchange rate regime is
chosen, knowing that the state dependent security payos occur at the realized exchange rate.
Producers set their prices at home and abroad before shocks, i.e. supply shocks, production and
consumption are realized. Households decide about money balances and consumption while ﬁrms
supply the goods that consumers demand once uncertainty is revealed. In the foreign country a
similar pattern of events occurs.
2.1 Preferences and prices














The parameter N can be seen as a random shift in the marginal disutility of work eort with a
mean value of H1 (lnN)=0and a variance 2
n,w h e r eH1 is the expectation operator across
states of natures v and lnN [%>%]. A negative supply shock, a rise in N, allows the household
to produce less in a given amount of time. The shift parameter in money demand is reﬂected by
". Real balances are equal to Pv











and  reﬂects the parameter of the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods.
It captures the sensitivity of allocation between home and foreign goods with respect to relative
price changes of home and foreign goods. The parameter q =1(1  P), measures the overall
share of home goods in the home consumption basket. Trade openness is measured by the
parameter 0 ? 1. This formulation accounts for the empirical consumption bias towards
tradeable goods produced locally. When ?1 households potentially give a higher weight to


















The price and consumption indices for the composite goods are deﬁned as
5Note that whether price stickiness results because the price in the current period has to be announced at an



































whereby the elasticity of substitution between any two heterogeneous goods is reﬂected by A1.












The resource constraint in the foreign country takes on a similar form. Foreign agents (denoted
by ) have identical preferences, except that N and O may dier from N and O. For simplicity
it is assumed that N and N are uncorrelated. Additionally it is assumed that foreign agents hold











with q =1 P. The foreign consumption and price indices are similar to the ones for the
home country. The conditional commodity demand functions are derived by minimizing the



























2.2 The budget constraint
The home and foreign agent l have a state v speciﬁc budget constraint,
v + ZvOv + 	v = SvFv + Pv  P0 + Wv= (5)
	v denotes the state dependent part of the budget constraint, Zv, the nominal wage rate, and










Kv(l>})g}  ZvOv (l)=
The equilibrium taxes by the government are given by Wv = (Pv  P0). Vv is the nominal
exchange rate, deﬁned as the number of domestic currency units per unit of foreign currency.
The equilibrium revenue from producing goods equals




































2.3 Households’ optimality conditions and money supply
The following optimality conditions for consumption, real balances and labour eort for agent l
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5The foreign country has similar ﬁrst order conditions. Combining the domestic and foreign












The implication is that the relative marginal utilities of consumption at home and abroad need
to equate to the relative marginal utilities of holding money. The money supply in each country
is determined by the national monetary authorities and is conditional on the supply disturbances
N and N. It is assumed that each country decides on an exchange rate rule for setting the
money supply. The precise monetary policy rules are speciﬁed below.
2.4 Firms’ optimal price setting
For illustrative purposes, we introduce the shadow price SK>Yv which would be charged if all












Thus, ﬂexible goods producers set prices such that the marginal costs, N
SK>Y v,f r o map r i c e
reduction equate to the marginal utility from income, F1
S .
For the remaining part, it is assumed that prices are ﬁxed. Firms at home [abroad] do not
enter separate price contracts for domestic and international sales and set one domestic price,
SKv(}) [S
Iv(})]. The households at home and abroad then pay for their requested foreign good




Vv . As ﬁrms set their price
before the realization of the shock they like to maximize the real discounted value of their proﬁts.












, equal the marginal costs,
i.e. the expected value of the price set by ﬂexible price producers adjusted by the marginal gains
from sales H1
¡
SK>Y F1 · O@S
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Expectational prices contain a form of risk premium, which depends on variances and covariances
of the variables displayed in the equations above. The risk premium reﬂects the fact that prices
need to be set before shocks are realized and plays a role in the link between shocks and monetary
6policy. Monetary policy can be used to aect the variances and covariances of the shocks and
therefore it is able to inﬂuence the risk premium.
The model outlined above is not linear in logs and it becomes necessary to solve the model by
a second order approximation around a non-stochastic steady state. Let’s deﬁne for any variable




where ¯ [ is the value in the deterministic equilibrium. Taking a second
order approximation of the price equations around the deterministic symmetric equilibrium for
¯ N = ¯ N =1and accounting for the fact that [ ¯ [
¯ [ = x + x2
2 + R(%)
3 it follows that for
expectational prices the following risk premiums are derived
H1 (pK)=RsK>H 1 (pI)=Rs
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The risk premiums for domestic prices, RsK and Rs



















3 = H (ln[  H (ln[))
2 = 2
{ and terms of order
R(%)
3 are ignored. They increase with the volatility of the shadow price, SK>Yv. This follows
from the fact that ﬁx price producers would like to adjust their prices in response to a supply
disturbance but are not allowed to do so. To be compensated for this they require a risk premium.
In contrast, the expected ﬁxed prices charged abroad depend on the expected nominal exchange
rate, H1 (s), which in turn depends on whether the economies allow for trade in state contingent
asset.
2.5 International asset markets
Two dierent ﬁnancial market structures are deﬁned, namely ﬁnancial autarky and complete
asset markets. Under ﬁnancial autarky an international ﬁnancial market does not exist and
ex-ante trade in state-contingent assets is not possible. When ﬁnancial markets are integrated,
it is assumed that su!cient contingent ﬁnancial market instruments are available, which allow
households to diversify idiosyncratic risk, so that sharing of consumption risk is possible. Fi-
nancial market integration corresponds to a movement from ﬁnancial autarky towards complete
ﬁnancial markets.
2.5.1 Segmented ﬁnancial markets
If there is no ex ante trade in state contingent assets then ﬁnancial markets are segmented,
denoted with vhj, and households cannot trade in any security with each other. Thus, they
7can neither borrow or lend. It follows that 	v =0in any state of nature. Thus, the current
account needs to be in balance and the nominal value of the domestic goods consumed abroad
PVvS
KvF
Kv needs to equal the amount of foreign goods consumed at home in nominal terms,















Under segmented ﬁnancial markets the relative consumption of the home and foreign country
needs to equal the relative prices, i.e. the real exchange rate,
VvS 
v
Sv , and the terms of trade,
VvS 
Kv
SIv . The responsiveness of the real exchange rate (terms of trade) to movements in relative
consumption under segmented markets is aected by .T h eh i g h e r the less (more) accentuated
need to be shifts in the real exchange rate (terms of trade) for a given change in the relative
consumption pattern.
2.5.2 Complete ﬁnancial markets
Under complete ﬁnancial markets, deﬁned as frps, there exists a full set of state contingent
assets. Hence, an asset is traded for each state v of the world, reﬂected by the term 	v =
(EK>v + VvEI>v) 
P
S(tK>SEK>S + t
I>SVvEI>S) for the home country. A similar expression
applies for the foreign country. The quantity of securities paying one unit of country K currency
in state S purchased by the household in country K equals EK>S and VvEI>S while the pay-os
equal EK>v and VvEI>v, respectively. The price for one unit of a security paying o in country K
currency in state S equals tK>S, while t
I>S is the price of the security in the foreign country paying
o in state S. State contingent assets are in zero net supply and the trade in state contingent
assets takes place before shocks are realized while payments occur after the realization of the
disturbances at the actual exchange rate.6 From the budget constraint the optimal security





















Households at home and abroad balance their expected marginal utilities of holding domestic
and foreign securities across dierent state of natures, adjusting the relative price of assets by














(UHY  · V)
1
´= (14)
6The zero net supply restriction implies that qEK>S +PWqWEW
K>S = qEI>S +PWqWEW
I>S =0 .T h u s ,c o u n t r i e s
hold assets of each other independent of their size. The asset prices are unae c t e db yt h es i z eo ft h ee c o n o m y .
8Contrary to the segmented market case, it is now the ratio of the marginal utilities at home and
abroad, adjusted by the relative expected revenue of sales, which have to equal the real exchange
rate. Since asset trade takes place before exchange rate regime decisions are made, households
will expect a symmetric equilibrium, such that  =0 .7 Consequently, an additional unit of
revenue in either country will be expected to be equally distributed. The marginal utilities of
income across countries are equalized when adjusted by the nominal exchange rate and risk
sharing is complete.
2.5.3 The expected exchange rate
From the relative money demand equation (7) and the determination of relative consumption



















Under segmented ﬁnancial markets, the expected exchange rate depends on how expected foreign
and domestic prices develop
H1 (svhj)=
(1  )(Rs
I  RsK)+( 1 )






where  =( 1 (1  )(q + q)). Under segmented ﬁnancial markets households do not have
access to a complete set of state contingent assets. The expected exchange rate acts as an insur-
ance device. More precisely, the expected exchange rate guarantees the expected relative income
transfer needed in the absence of international ﬁnancial markets by adjusting the purchasing
power of households. Therefore, the expected exchange rate depends on the relative size of
domestic and foreign risk premiums as well as on the volatility of the nominal exchange rate.
Under complete ﬁnancial markets the expected nominal exchange rate only depends on the
expected money supply, which is conditional on the expected realization of the supply distur-
bance. As H1 (lnN)=0it follows that H1 (sfrps)=0 . No adjustment of the expected
exchange rate is needed to provide households with the expected consumption levels across
countries. Thus, complete ﬁnancial markets stabilize the expected nominal exchange rate. As
risk sharing is complete, expected marginal utility levels are equalized across countries.
7The theoretical results discussed below are independent of the timing of asset trade. They also hold if asset
trade takes place after exchange rate regime decisions are made, which implies that K 6=1 .A p r o o f c a n b e
provided on request.
92.5.4 International asset markets and monetary policy rules
The objective of this paper is to assess the properties of alternative exchange rate arrangements
on the country’s national price level when the economy moves towards internationally integrated
ﬁnancial markets. Therefore, it is necessary to specify the behavior of the foreign monetary
authority. To simply matters, it is assumed that the foreign economy is large relative to the
home country, so that P $4and q $ 1. It then follows that a monetary policy rule that
stabilizes foreign prices is a natural benchmark for the foreign economy because stabilizing foreign
producer prices replicates a situation of completely ﬂexible prices in the large foreign country. To
ensure such a target, the foreign economy sets its money supply so that the foreign risk premium
Rs
I equates to zero. Then the foreign money supply adjusts in the following way: m
v = k.
For the domestic economy, an exchange rate peg is compared to a monetary policy of targeting
domestic goods prices. The latter rule utilizes the monetary instrument to stabilize domestic
goods prices. This eliminates the need for ﬁxed price goods producers to require a risk premium
since their inability to adjust their prices becomes irrelevant. Such a rule leaves the nominal
exchange rate free to ﬂoat. When the monetary authority of the domestic economy aims at
targeting the risk premium on domestic goods prices, RsK equals zero, it adjusts the domestic
money supply as follows
mv = k> (16)
regardless of the ﬁnancial market structure. The monetary policy rule induces a procyclical
reaction of domestic money supply to movements in domestic supply disturbances.
In the case of a peg the home monetary authority varies the home money supply to maintain
t h ee x c h a n g er a t ea tat a r g e tr a t e¯ V,s ot h a tsv  H1 (s)=0holds. This implies that 2
s =0 .
The domestic monetary authority needs to account for the diering nominal exchange rate
movements under segmented and complete ﬁnancial market structures to ensure its exchange
rate target. The ﬁnancial market conditions (12) and (14) imply that the nominal exchange rate







v = mv  m
v> (17)
respectively. Conditional on the money supplies at home and abroad, the nominal exchange rate
will be more sensitive under complete than segmented ﬁnancial markets when  A 1.G i v e n
(17), domestic money supply adjusts regardless of the ﬁnancial market structure by
mv = k. (18)
Given the monetary policy rules, the main ex post realized values of the model can be
10summarized in Table (1). On this basis, it is now possible to assess the eﬀects of the diﬀerent
exchange rate arrangements on NPL in the process of ﬁnancial market integration.
2.6 National price levels and the exchange rate regime





The aim is to analyze the eﬀect monetary policy has on NPL in the process of ﬁnancial market
integration. We therefore express the NPL in expected terms, accounting for the fact that the
model is not linear in logs
E−1 (npl)=E−1 (p) − E−1 (p∗ + s).
Given the deﬁnition of the price indices one can write













as the foreign economy is large, n∗ → 1 and it stabilizes the foreign risk premium. The expected

















given the expected nominal exchange rate E−1
¡
sfms¢
under segmented and complete asset mar-
kets
E−1 (sseg)=
(∆ − 1)RpH − (1 − η)





and E−1 (scomp)=0 . (20)
The "price eﬀect" occurs because domestic ﬁrms cannot adjust their prices after supply distur-
bances have occurred. Therefore, they require a risk premium RpH, which causes the domestic,
and hence, NPL (19) to rise.
The expected NPL (19) is also aﬀected by the variability of the nominal exchange rate. Any
movement in the nominal exchange rate induces a "relative price eﬀect". The greater η the higher
will be the impact of exchange rate movements on overall price movements. Since goods prices
are sticky relative price changes, which are due to the nominal exchange rate, are desirable from
the view of domestic households when η>1 because this allows them to substitute domestic
for foreign goods for a given price change. As a result, the price of the consumption basket will
be kept at the desired level. Consequently, the NPL declines when the nominal exchange rate is
allowed to ﬂuctuate freely.
11Equation (20) shows that the expected exchange rate induces a "purchasing power eect"
because it adjusts the purchasing power of households. For A1 the expected exchange rate
mitigates the positive eect of the risk premium on the NPL while it dampens the negative eect
exchange rate variability has on (19). More precisely, a higher risk premium causes a higher
expected exchange rate. This takes away purchasing power of the home economy and causes
ceteris paribus the NPL to decline. The variability of the nominal exchange rate brings about
relative price changes. The relative price change improves the purchasing power of domestic
households and is reﬂected in a lower expected exchange rate. Therefore, the expected exchange
rate mitigates the negative eect exchange rate variability has on (19).
The dierent eects can be illustrated in more detail when considering the impact of the
dierent exchange rate regimes on the NPL. Under a ﬂoating exchange rate regime, the NPL

















respectively. Under a ﬂoat, the NPL depends only the variability of the nominal exchange rate.


















and, hence, a ﬁxed exchange rate regime causes the NPL to rise with the risk premium of
domestic goods prices. Table (1) allows to state the variability of the nominal exchange rate and















On the basis of equations (21)-(22) it is possible to state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The expected national price level under
(i) a ﬁxed exchange rate regime increases in the process of ﬁnancial market integration.
(ii) a ﬂoating exchange rate regime declines in the process of ﬁnancial market integration.
Proof. To establish the claim made in part one of proposition 1, note from equation (22) that


















12for 0 ?q 1 and A1. The claim made in part one of proposition 1 immediately follows from
equation (24).

















for 0 ?q?1 and  6=1 . Equation (25) establishes the claim made in part two of proposition 1.
As the monetary authority maintains a ﬁxed exchange rate, it cannot resolve the risk premium
demanded by domestic goods producers. This creates uncertainty in the economy and causes
the NPL to rise with the risk premium, as illustrated in equation (22) and (24). However, under
segmented ﬁnancial markets this eect will be compensated via the expected exchange rate.
The risk premium also increases the expected exchange rate under segmented ﬁnancial markets,
which mitigates the NPL, due to the induced income transfer from home to abroad. This latter
eect does not occur under complete ﬁnancial markets. Here the expected exchange rate is
stabilized due to the presence of a complete set of state contingent assets. Consequently, the
positive eect of the risk premium on the NPL will be ampliﬁed when ﬁnancial markets become
integrated. To summarise, the NPL will be lower under segmented than complete international
ﬁnancial markets under an exchange rate peg.
The opposite pattern occurs under ﬂoats, as shown in equation (21) and (25). The monetary
authority accommodates the domestic supply shock and resolves the risk premium. This stabi-
lizes the level of domestic goods prices and leads to a lower NPL via the induced ﬂexibility in the
nominal exchange rate. The relative price changes, induced by the nominal exchange rate, aect
the expected exchange rate negatively. The lower expected exchange rate under ﬂoats raises
the purchasing power of the domestic country and increases the NPL under segmented ﬁnancial
markets. This latter eect is not present under complete ﬁnancial markets. As a consequence,
the NPL appears to be higher under segmented than complete ﬁnancial markets when the coun-
try decides to let the nominal exchange rate ﬂoat freely. This holds as long as the economy is
open to trade, 0 ?q?1, and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods 
is not unity while under ﬁxed exchange rate regimes NPL rise in the process of ﬁnancial market
integration as long as A1.
It is noteworthy at this point to consider the available empirical estimates for the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods. Obstfeld and Rogo (2000b) survey some
of the literature and quote estimates of between 1=2 and 21=4 for individual goods. For the
average elasticity of traded goods  lies in the range of 5 to 6 (Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003), Harrigan (1993) as well as Treﬂer and Lai (1999)). The real business cycle literature uses
13values of around 1=5 (see Chari, Kehoe and Mc Gratten, 2002). Adolfson et al. (2007) provide
estimates of  of around 11. Thus, there is considerable empirical evidence that the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods is not unity and larger than one. Hence, the
following corollary should hold:
Corollary 1 The equilibrium national price level increases [decreases] when ﬁnancial markets














This corollary, that the equilibrium level of national prices increases [decreases] with the rigidity
[ﬂexibility] of the exchange rate regime choice in the process of ﬁnancial market integration,
is the central hypothesis of the model. In the next section the paper, we test this conclusion
empirically.
3 Empirical Evidence
This section provides evidence on the relationship between international ﬁnancial integration
and national price levels based on a panel of 54 countries.
3.1 Measurement issues
Three crucial points pertain to measurement issues: First, the measurement of the price level
deserves particular attention. Second, assessing the degree of international ﬁnancial integration is
not straightforward. Third, the identiﬁcation of a country’s exchange rate regime is complicated
b yt h ef a c tt h a tt h eo !cial exchange rate regime the country reports to the IMF need not
correspond to the country’s de facto policy. We discuss each of these issues in turn.
National price level (NPL): We use the same data deﬁnition as in Broda (2006). The data is
taken from the Penn World Tables (PWT) 6.2 and, alternatively, from the World Development
Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank. The data is computed using the same method-
ology across countries. This means that, in contrast to real exchange rate data, the NPL in
this study is comparable across countries, see Summers and Heston (1991). These data sources
collect prices of dierent goods and services for a selected number of countries. Drawing on this
sample of prices, PPP indices for each country relative to the US are constructed, deﬁning a
country’s NPL as the PPP index of that country divided by it’s foreign exchange rate. The NPL










14where vl>XV i st h ee x c h a n g er a t eb e t w e e nc o u n t r yl’s currency and the U.S. dollar. The weight
of good m is denoted by $m and slm are national goods prices.
International Financial Integration (FIN): The key explanatory variable measuring the degree
of international ﬁnancial integration using the gross foreign asset position relative to GDP as
constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a, 2003, 2006). For country l at date w the measure
ILQ lw is given by the sum of foreign assets IDlw and foreign liabilities IOlw over GDP
ILQ lw =
ID lw + IOlw
JGSlw
= (27)
This variable closely corresponds to the theoretical notion of international ﬁnancial integration
in terms of the availability of state-contingent assets. Furthermore, Kose et al. (2006a) argue
that this quantity-based measure of international ﬁnancial market integration, based on actual
ﬂows and stocks, provides the best available measure of a country’s integration with international
ﬁnancial markets.
Exchange rate regime classiﬁcation: A recent literature documents that the exchange rate
regime a central bank o!cially announces not necessarily corresponds to actual policy. Even un-
der o!cially freely ﬂoating exchange rates, central banks regularly intervene in foreign exchange
markets. For this reason, we do not rely on the de jure classiﬁcation provided by the IMF’s
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements, but draw on the de facto classiﬁcations provided by
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003, 2005) and Reinhart and Rogo (2004). For each classiﬁca-
tion, we distinguish between a peg (Fix), a ﬂoating exchange rate (Float) and an intermediate
regime (INT). Table (2) documents the number of observations available under each classiﬁca-
tion for four dierent samples. For the purpose of this paper, the classiﬁcation of Reinhart and
Rogo (2004) is more relevant, since its puts more weight on actual exchange rate volatility.8
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) also include changes in reserve holdings, which essentially
scales down the weight of exchange rate ﬂuctuations.
3.2 The estimation strategy
We estimate the following regression using Panel OLS
logQSOlw = lw + 0 × ILQlw + 1 {(IL[lw + LQWlw) × ILQ lw} + (28)
2 {IOR lw × ILQ lw} + 0[lw + %lw=
The vector [lw contains a set of control variables with coe!cient vector . All regressions allow
for ﬁxed (time) eects. We apply the two alternative classiﬁcations explained above to distinguish
8See Aghion et al. (2006) for this point.
15three dierent exchange rate regimes. The dummy variables IL[lw, LQWlw and IOR lw have a
value of one if the country exhibits a ﬁxed exchange rate, an intermediate degree of exchange
rate management or a freely ﬂoating exchange rate, respectively, and zero otherwise. Note that
we include both the level of ILQlw and its interaction with the exchange rate regime dummy.
Our main hypothesis, formulated in corollary 1, suggests that 0 + 1 A 0 and 0 + 2 ? 0.
That is, ﬁnancial integration has a positive eect on the national price level under pegged and
intermediate exchange rate regimes and has a negative eect under ﬂoating exchange rates. We
test this hypothesis using a standard "2 distributed Wald test statistic.9 To check the robustness
o ft h er e s u l t s ,w ea l l o wt h ee ects of ﬁxed and intermediate regimes to be dierent. We estimate
the following regression
logQSOlw = lw + 0 × ILQ lw + 1 {(IL[lw × ILQ lw} + 2 {LQWlw × ILQlw} (29)
3 {IORlw × ILQlw} + 0[lw + %lw=
We also include an extensive set of various control variables which is mirrored in the vector
[0
lw =( l o g JGSlw>RSHQ lw>logVL]Hlw>RSHQ lw × logJGSlw> (30)
GXUlw>FUHGLW lw>IL[ lw>LQW lw>IOR lw)=
The most important is the log of per-capita GDP (JGS) as taken from the PWT. This vari-
able captures the well-known Balassa-Samuelson connection of productivity dierentials between
tradable and non-tradable goods and the overall price level. Thus, we expect JGS to enter the
e q u a t i o nw i t hap o s i t i v es i g n .T h ed e g r e eo ft r a d eo p e n n e s s( RSHQ), measured by the ratio of
exports plus imports to GDP, is also taken from the PWT. As mentioned earlier, it is frequently
argued that countries which are more exposed to trade should exhibit lower price levels. Thus
we expect RSHQ to have a negative sign. The country size (VL]H) is measured by the (log)
population reported by the PWT. We include a measure of the level of the development of the
domestic ﬁnancial system (FUHGLW). This measure is given by the log of the ratio of private
credit to GDP obtained from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000). We control for the fact
that in many developing countries the exchange rate regime exhibits a very unstable pattern.
Therefore, we construct a measure of the duration (GXU) of a given exchange rate regime (in
years). It corresponds to a time trend in the price level that experiences a break whenever the
9As Aghion et al. (2006) note in a similar set-up, the endogenous nature of the exchange rate regime is less of
an issue with an interaction term than with single variables. The reason is that the endogeneity of the exchange
rate regime choice could bias the coe!cient on the exchange rate regime in a linear regression. Assume that
the exchange rate regime choice coincides with other policies associated with a higher price level. It follows that
this can only bias the interaction coe!cients to the extent that the correlation between these policies and the
exchange rate regime choice varies signiﬁcantly with the degree of ﬁnancial integration.
16exchange rate regime changes.10 Finally, the interaction term RSHQ × log(JGS) is included
in analogy to Broda (2006) and can be motivated by the assumption that a high propensity to
trade should pull a country’s price level upwards.11 Some of the non-OECD countries, notably
China, accumulate large external positions while maintaining a restricted capital account. To
account for those cases, we include Chinn and Ito’s (2007) measure of capital account openness
(NDRSHQ) in those regressions.12
To check the robustness of the results with respect to the time-series properties of the vari-
ables, we allow for non-stationarity and possible cointegration and estimate the model using
Dynamic OLS following, among others, Mark and Sul (2003). This amounts to estimating an
augmented equation which includes one lead and one lag of all explanatory variables. For this
purpose, we restrict the sample to include only those exchange rate regimes that lasted for a
minimum of three years to guarantee that the contemporaneous observation and both the lead
and the lag are taken to the same underlying exchange rate regime.
The set of countries comprises all OECD and major emerging market countries. However,
we leave Luxembourg, Hong Kong, and Singapore out as these o-shore ﬁnancial centers hold
exceptionally high net foreign asset positions. To account for the possibility of nonlinearity
in the relationship between ﬁnancial integration and national price levels, we follow Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2001b and 2004) and split the sample into OECD and non-OECD countries.
They argue that the size of the foreign asset positions as well as its composition might depend
nonlinearly on the level of economic development.
We use annual data for the period 1990-2004 for 54 countries. Before 1990, the dynamics
of the gross foreign asset position, our measure of ﬁnancial integration, were essentially ﬂat.13
Figure (2) depicts the average degree of ﬁnancial integration for all three country groups. Appar-
ently, ﬁnancial integration increased dramatically in the post-1990 period. Therefore, we base
our main speciﬁcation on data ranging from 1990 to 2004, but also report results for the 1970-
2004 period. The graph also conﬁrms that OECD and Non-OECD countries exhibit a dierent
pace of ﬁnancial integration that justiﬁes to split the sample accordingly.
10This indicator roughly corresponds to Broda’s (2006) index of exchange rate regime shifts.
11See Kravis and Lipsey (1987) for this argument.
12The regressions based on price level data from the WDI data base include a step-dummy for membership in
the European Monetary Union (EMU) from 1999 onwards. This accounts for the apparent large structural break
in the data for EMU member countries.
13Kose et al. (2006b) estimate a panel using the same data set on foreign assets and liabilities. They refer to
the post-1987 period as the "globalization period".
173.3 A ﬁrst look at the data
In a ﬁrst attempt to gauge the relationship between ILQlw and logQSOlw for dierent exchange
rate regimes, ﬁgures (3) and (4) present the combinations of these two variables in a set of scatter
plots. Under managed exchange rate regimes, i.e. under pegs and intermediate regimes, a clear
positive relationship emerges. Countries that are more ﬁnancially integrated have higher price
levels. Under ﬂoating exchange rates, this relationship ﬂattens substantially under the LYS
classiﬁcation and turns negative for the RR classiﬁcation. Hence, this rough evidence indeed
suggests a nominal exchange rate regime-dependent pattern of interdependence. Note that, as
stated above, the RR classiﬁcation is more relevant in this context as it puts more weight on
actual exchange rate volatility in the classiﬁcation of de-facto regimes than the LYS classiﬁcation.
We use formal econometric testing to identify this regime dependent nature and appropriately
control for other explanatory variables.
In a second step, we discover the unconditional relationship between the national price level
and the degree of international ﬁnancial integration, that is, we do not condition on the prevailing
exchange rate system. Table (3) reports the results from regressing QSO on ILQ and other
major explanatory variables. The degree of international ﬁnancial integration enters with a
signiﬁcant positive coe!cient. Thus, countries that have more access to international ﬁnancial
assets exhibit a higher price level. It turns out that all control variables are signiﬁcant and
have the expected sign. Countries with a higher per capita income and a higher level of domestic
ﬁnancial development have higher price levels. On the other hand, more open countries and larger
countries tend to have smaller price levels. The interaction term RSHQ × JGS enters with
a positive sign indicating that the price-eect of GDP is stronger the more open the economy.
With respect to the control variables the ﬁndings are completely in line with Broda (2006),
among others. Results based on WDI data exhibit similar characteristics.
3 . 4 T h er o l eo ft h ee x c h a n g er a t er e g i m e
We now turn to the eect dierent exchange rate regimes have on national prices in the process
of international ﬁnancial market integration. The baseline results are reported in table (4).
All major control variables remain signiﬁcant and have the expected sign. Most importantly
the level of ﬁnancial integration enters positively, while the interaction terms with prevailing
exchange rate regime indicate important regime-dependent eects. The Wald tests conﬁrm this
ﬁnding: For both the LYS and the Reinhart-Rogo classiﬁcation we ﬁnd a positive price eect
of integration under managed exchange rates and a signiﬁcant negative eect under ﬂoating
exchange rates. Technically, 0+1 A 0 for ﬁxed and intermediate exchange rates and 0+1 ? 0
18for ﬂoating exchange rates. Thus, we can corroborate our main hypothesis for both exchange
rate classiﬁcation schemes. Under the Reinhart-Rogo classiﬁcation for PWT data, for example,
a 10% larger share of gross foreign assets increase the national price level by 0.27 percentage
points under ﬁxed and intermediate exchange rate regimes and lowers the price level by 0.3
percentage points under ﬂoating exchange rates. The regressions based on the price level data
from the WDI data set support these numbers.
In many transition countries, data availability and data quality for the early 1990s is a
source of concern. Therefore, we also estimate a regression excluding all transition countries.
The results, which are presented in table (5), lend further support to our main hypothesis.
In tables (6) and (7) we separate OECD countries from Non-OECD countries. Interestingly,
the data indeed suggests that developed and emerging countries exhibit dierent response pat-
terns as suggested by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001b and 2004). The price level in OECD
countries, for example, reacts less to JGS and to FUHGLW, our measure of domestic ﬁnancial
development, than in the larger set of countries. OECD countries, on the contrary, respond
more to the measure of trade openness and its interaction with income. International ﬁnancial
integration has a larger price impact in the OECD sample than in the large sample. Under
the LYS classiﬁcation, for example, the coe!cient on ILQ is 0.033 for all countries but 0.059
for OECD countries. Our theoretical hypothesis gains strong empirical support in the OECD
sample. Moving from a ﬁnancially closed economy to a fully open capital account raises the
national price level under pegged and intermediate exchange rate regimes and lowers the price
level under ﬂoating exchange rates. For the Non-OECD countries, we ﬁnd limited evidence in
favor of a negative price eect of ﬁnancial integration under ﬂoating exchange rates and only
insigniﬁcant or negative price eects under managed exchange rate regimes.
Since our sample comprises various short-lived exchange rate regimes, we report a separate
set of results for those regimes, that have a minimum duration of three years.14 Table (8) con-
ﬁrms our main result indicating that it is not due to exchange rate regime instabilities. Finally,
tables (9) and (10) document the results for the long sample period ranging from 1970 to 2004
for the large set of countries and for the OECD sample. The degree of ﬁnancial integration enters
positively in both cases. Under managed exchange rate, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive price im-
pact of ﬁnancial integration. For ﬂoating exchange rates, this eect becomes negative under the
LYS and the RR classiﬁcation. However, the negative eects lacks statistical signiﬁcance for the
large set of countries. These results improve if we restrict the sample to OECD countries. Under
both de facto classiﬁcation schemes, the price eect is statistically signiﬁcant and negative under
ﬂexible exchange rates. Only for the RR classiﬁcation, however, do we also ﬁnd a statistically
14I nh i sc a s ew ed r o pt h eGXUlw index.
19signiﬁcant positive eect under managed exchange rate regimes. Table (11) reports the results
based on the estimation of (29), i.e. with explicitly allowing the intermediate regime to have a
separate ee c t .I tt u r n so u tt h a tt h ee ect of ﬁnancial integration on the price level changes its
sign for ﬂoating exchange rate regimes. In other word, bundling ﬁxed and intermediate exchange
rate regimes together is an innocuous simpliﬁcation.
To control for the possibility that the results reﬂect a process of price convergence of countries
with relatively low national price levels we allow in tables (12) and (13) for initial price levels
and levels of ﬁnancial integration of country l in the sample. More precisely, we estimate two
speciﬁcations that include either QSOor ILQ of a base year, i.e. 1990. The results are presented
in tables (12) and (13). All previous ﬁndings remain qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged
for given values of QSO1990 and ILQ1990.
Finally, table (14) contains the estimates obtained from using Dynamic Panel OLS to estimate
the model. Both 0+1 and 0+1 have the correct sign and are in almost all cases signiﬁcantly
dierent from zero. Again, ﬁnancial integration lowers prices under ﬂoats and raises prices under
managed exchange rates.
In sum, we ﬁnd strong evidence in support of our main theoretical hypothesis for the post-
1990 sample in which ﬁnancial integration gained momentum. Based on the available de facto
exchange rate classiﬁcation schemes we ﬁnd that national price levels are higher for those coun-
tries that actively manage their exchange rate and lower for those countries that let their currency
ﬂoat freely. This result stems mostly from the advanced economies in our sample.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper investigated the eects of international ﬁnancial integration on national price levels.
In particular, we shed light on the role of the exchange rate regime for the relationship between
price levels and ﬁnancial integration. A standard two country open economy model with nominal
rigidities was employed to derive our main hypothesis: The eect of ﬁnancial integration on
national price levels depends on the exchange rate regime. Under ﬂoating exchange rates, deeper
ﬁnancial integration lowers the price level. Under managed exchange rates, on the contrary,
ﬁnancial integration raises the price level. Extensive evidence based on a panel of 54 countries
supported this result. For the overall set of countries and, in particular, for the subset of OECD
countries, we ﬁnd strong evidence of a regime-dependent eect of ﬁnancial integration on the
national price level. For ﬂoating exchange rates, the price level decreases in the degree of ﬁnancial
integration. For managed exchange rates, the price level increases. As a by-product, the paper
proposed a rationale for the well-documented systematic deviations from PPP. To the extend
20that countries exhibit dierent degrees of international ﬁnancial integration, their price levels
dier when expressed in a common currency.
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245A p p e n d i x : T h e l i s t o f c o u n t r i e s
country subsamples country subsamples
OECD Non-Transition OECD Non-Transition
Argentina + Japan + +
Australia + + Korea (South) + +
Austria + + Latvia
Belgium + + Lithuania
Bolivia + Malaysia +
Brazil + Malta +
Bulgaria Mexico + +
Canada + + Netherlands + +
Chile + New Zealand + +
China (P.R.) + Norway + +
Columbia + Paraguay +
Cyprus + Peru +
Czech Republic + Philippines +
Denmark + + Poland +
Ecuador + Portugal +
Estonia Romania
Finland + + Russia
France + + Slovakia +
Germany + + Slovenia
Greece + + South Africa +
Hungary + Spain + +
Iceland + + Switzerland + +
India + Thailand +
Indonesia + Turkey + +
Ireland + + United Kingdom + +
Israel + United States + +






































all countries all countries without outliers
Figure 1: National price levels (NPL) from Penn World Tables against international ﬁnancial















Figure 2: Average degree of international ﬁnancial integration as measured by the sum of foreign


















































































Figure 3: National price levels (PWT data) against international ﬁnancial integration for dierent


















































































Figure 4: National price levels (PWT data) against international ﬁnancial integration for dierent
exchange rate regimes, 1990-2004
29Table 1: Summary of the realized endogenous variables
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Table 2: Number of exchange rate regime observations, 1990-2004
Sample FX regime Classiﬁcation
de jure LYS RR
all countries Fix 174 209 142
Intermediate 213 59 311
Float 217 154 55
OECD countries Fix 75 143 87
Intermediate 128 20 174
Float 135 108 50
Non-OECD countries Fix 99 66 55
Intermediate 85 39 137
Float 82 46 5
No transition countries Fix 124 179 121
Intermediate 186 55 274
Float 209 138 55
30Table 3: Preliminary results, all countries, 1990-2004
II I I I I I V VV I






























































U2 0.718 0.750 0.797 0.800 0.836 0.842
rev= 823 809 809 809 809 744





























































U2 0.349 0.358 0.377 0.382 0.382 0.435
rev= 808 807 794 794 794 729
Notes: The dependent variable is the national price level. Standard errors are given in
parenthesis and are clustered at the country level. All regressions include time speciﬁc ﬁxed-
eects. A signiﬁcance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by , ,a n d, respectively.
31Table 4: Results for all countries, 1990-2004
sample: 1990 - 2004 I II III IV
PWT data WDI data
FX regime classiﬁcation FX regime classiﬁcation





























0 + 1 0.017 0.027 0.023 0.033































































U2 0.848 0.846 0.467 0.512
rev= 744 744 729 729
Notes: The dependent variable is the national price level. Standard errors are given in
parenthesis and are clustered at the country level. All regressions include time speciﬁc ﬁxed-
eects and the exchange rate regime dummies separately. The Wald test evaluates whether the
reported sum of the coe!cients is signiﬁcantly dierent from zero. A signiﬁcance level of 1%,
5%, and 10% is indicated by , ,a n d, respectively.
32Table 5: Results for all countries excluding transition countries, 1990-2004
sample: 1990 - 2004 I II III IV
PWT data WDI data
FX regime classiﬁcation FX regime classiﬁcation






























0 + 1 0.021 0.024 0.015 0.030































































U2 0.872 0.870 0.427 0.501
rev= 611 611 596 596
Notes: The dependent variable is the national price level. Standard errors are given in
parenthesis and are clustered at the country level. All regressions include time speciﬁc ﬁxed-
eects and the exchange rate regime dummies separately. The Wald test evaluates whether the
reported sum of the coe!cients is signiﬁcantly dierent from zero. A signiﬁcance level of 1%,
5%, and 10% is indicated by , ,a n d, respectively.
33Table 6: Results for OECD countries, 1990-2004
sample: 1990 - 2004 I II III IV
PWT data WDI data
FX regime classiﬁcation FX regime classiﬁcation





























0 + 1 0.015 0.034 0.032 0.049
































































U2 0.807 0.780 0.361 0.503
rev= 404 404 404 404
Notes: The dependent variable is the national price level. Standard errors are given in
parenthesis and are clustered at the country level. All regressions include time speciﬁc ﬁxed-
eects and the exchange rate regime dummies separately. The Wald test evaluates whether the
reported sum of the coe!cients is signiﬁcantly dierent from zero. A signiﬁcance level of 1%,
5%, and 10% is indicated by , ,a n d, respectively.
34Table 7: Results for Non-OECD countries, 1990-2004
sample: 1990 - 2004 I II III IV
PWT data WDI data
FX regime classiﬁcation FX regime classiﬁcation




























0 + 1 -0.059 -0.010 0.022 0.0004








































































U2 0.7321 0.732 0.678 0.705
rev= 309 309 294 294
Notes: The dependent variable is the national price level. Standard errors are given in
parenthesis and are clustered at the country level. All regressions include time speciﬁc ﬁxed-
eects and the exchange rate regime dummies separately. The Wald test evaluates whether the
reported sum of the coe!cients is signiﬁcantly dierent from zero. A signiﬁcance level of 1%,
5%, and 10% is indicated by , ,a n d, respectively.
35Table 8: Results for all countries excluding unstable regimes, 1990-2004
sample: 1990 - 2004 I II III IV
PWT data WDI data
FX regime classiﬁcation FX regime classiﬁcation





























0 + 1 0.029 0.028 0.036 0.035






















































U2 0.863 0.880 0.443 0.479
rev= 354 443 354 443
Notes: The dependent variable is the national price level. Standard errors are given in
parenthesis and are clustered at the country level. All regressions include time speciﬁc ﬁxed-
eects and the exchange rate regime dummies separately. The Wald test evaluates whether the
reported sum of the coe!cients is signiﬁcantly dierent from zero. A signiﬁcance level of 1%,
5%, and 10% is indicated by , ,a n d, respectively.
36Table 9: Results for all countries, 1970-2004
sample: 1970 - 2004 I II III IV
PWT data WDI data
FX regime classiﬁcation FX regime classiﬁcation






























0 + 1 0.029 0.043 0.031 0.050






























































U2 0.799 0.796 0.312 0.356
rev= 1468 1468 1267 1267
Notes: The dependent variable is the national price level. Standard errors are given in
parenthesis and are clustered at the country level. All regressions include time speciﬁc ﬁxed-
eects and the exchange rate regime dummies separately. The Wald test evaluates whether the
reported sum of the coe!cients is signiﬁcantly dierent from zero. A signiﬁcance level of 1%,
5%, and 10% is indicated by , ,a n d, respectively.
37Table 10: Results for OECD countries, 1970-2004
sample: 1970 - 2004 I II III IV
PWT data WDI data
FX regime classiﬁcation FX regime classiﬁcation





























0 + 1 0.004 0.024 0.043 0.079





























































U2 0.764 0.748 0.250 0.359
rev= 863 863 748 748
Notes: The dependent variable is the national price level. Standard errors are given in
parenthesis and are clustered at the country level. All regressions include time speciﬁc ﬁxed-
eects and the exchange rate regime dummies separately. The Wald test evaluates whether the
reported sum of the coe!cients is signiﬁcantly dierent from zero. A signiﬁcance level of 1%,
5%, and 10% is indicated by , ,a n d, respectively.
38Table 11: Results for all countries, 1990-2004, three FX regimes
sample: 1990 - 2004 I II III IV
PWT data WDI data
FX regime classiﬁcation FX regime classiﬁcation






































0 + 1 0.016 0.022 0.021 0.012
0 + 2 0.022 0.033 0.029 0.056































































U2 0.847 0.846 0.465 0.516
rev= 744 744 729 729
Notes: The dependent variable is the national price level. Standard errors are given in
parenthesis and are clustered at the country level. All regressions include time speciﬁc ﬁxed-
eects and the exchange rate regime dummies separately. The Wald test evaluates whether the
reported sum of the coe!cients is signiﬁcantly dierent from zero. A signiﬁcance level of 1%,
5%, and 10% is indicated by , ,a n d, respectively.
39Table 12: Results for all countries with initial value of national price level, 1990-2004
sample: 1990 - 2004 I II III IV
PWT data WDI data
FX regime classiﬁcation FX regime classiﬁcation



























0 + 1 0.008 0.010 0.018 0.026


































































U2 0.892 0.892 0.499 0.542
rev= 744 744 729 729
Notes: The dependent variable is the national price level. Standard errors are given
in parenthesis and are clustered at the country level. All regressions include time
speciﬁc ﬁxed-eects and the exchange rate regime dummies separately. The Wald
test evaluates whether the reported sum of the coe!cients is signiﬁcantly dierent
from zero. A signiﬁcance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by , ,a n d,
respectively.
40Table 13: Results for all countries with initial value of ﬁnancial integration, 1990-2004
sample: 1990 - 2004 I II III IV
PWT data WDI data
FX regime classiﬁcation FX regime classiﬁcation



























0 + 1 -0.007 -0.004 0.002 0.010


































































U2 0.866 0.858 0.495 0.538
rev= 743 743 728 728
Notes: The dependent variable is the national price level. Standard errors are given
in parenthesis and are clustered at the country level. All regressions include time
speciﬁc ﬁxed-eects and the exchange rate regime dummies separately. The Wald
test evaluates whether the reported sum of the coe!cients is signiﬁcantly dierent
from zero. A signiﬁcance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by , ,a n d,
respectively.
41Table 14: Results for all countries using Dynamic OLS, 1990-2004
sample: 1990 - 2004 I II III IV
PWT data WDI data
FX regime classiﬁcation FX regime classiﬁcation




























0 + 1 0.020 0.015 0.031 0.034






















































U2 0.897 0.890 0.416 0.506
rev= 311 428 311 428
Notes: The dependent variable is the national price level. The regression also includes
one lead and lag of all explanatory variables. Standard errors are given in parenthesis and
are clustered at the country level. All regressions include time speciﬁc ﬁxed-eects and the
exchange rate regime dummies separately. The Wald test evaluates whether the reported sum
of the coe!cients is signiﬁcantly dierent from zero. A signiﬁcance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% is
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